Evidence by Addison, Linda Leuchter
SMU Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 12
1983
Evidence
Linda Leuchter Addison
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linda Leuchter Addison, Evidence, 37 Sw L.J. 265 (1983)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol37/iss1/12
EVIDENCE
by
Linda Leuchter Addison *
URING this survey period the appellate courts of Texas handed
down numerous decisions construing various rules of evidence.
The cases of greatest significance lie in the following substantive
areas: (1) the hearsay rule and its exceptions; (2) expert opinion evidence;
(3) parol evidence; (4) judicial notice; (5) impeachment; (6) privileges;
(7) res ipsa loquitur; (8) admissibility; and (9) the dead man's statute. The
codified Texas Rules of Evidence will become effective on September 1,
1983, subject to their approval by the state legislature.' Although the pro-
mulgation of the rules by the Texas Supreme Court, their approval by the
legislature, and their effective date are all beyond the scope of this survey
period, the reader should be aware that the proposed rules both codify
existing Texas case law regarding evidence, and effect substantive changes
in certain long standing Texas rules of evidence.
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. Identifying Hearsay
Whether a record or statement offered to prove its truth is hearsay is
often difficult to determine. 2 "When a document is offered in evidence
which contains a written assertion by some one not a witness," it is in-
admissable under the hearsay rule.3 In Imperial Insurance Co. v. National
Homes Acceptance Corp.4 the appellant argued that the trial court had
erred in admitting into evidence a repair estimate prepared by the plain-
tilffs damage appraiser. The appellant contended that the repair estimate
was hearsay because the underlying records were not available to him.
The appraiser testified that he had prepared the repair estimate from field
notes he had taken when he inspected the property in question and admit-
ted that he had destroyed the field notes two years later in accordance with
• J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
I. See Order Regarding New Rules of Evidence, 641 S.W.2d XXXV (Tex. Ct. Rules
1982) [hereinafter cited as New Rules].
2. The proposed Texas rule of evidence 602 provides that "[a] witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter." New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LI. The hearsay rule
and its exceptions are defined in rules 801 through 806 of the court's proposed rules. Id. at
LVI-LXI.
3. IA R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 790 (3d ed. 1980).
4. 626 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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office procedures. The appraiser, however, had submitted his repair esti-
mate to the appellant three times before destroying his notes. The court,
therefore, found no error in the admission of the repair estimate, holding
that the appellant had had sufficient opportunity to examine the records
before their destruction.5 The court explained that documentary hearsay
is a written assertion by someone not a witness.6 In Imperial Insurance the
appraiser was a witness, and the hearsay rule was thus inapplicable to the
repair estimate.7
The hearsay rule is also inapplicable to out-of-court statements offered
for a reason other than to prove the truth of the statement.8 For example,
in Silva v. State9 the Corpus Christi court of appeals ruled that neither
checks nor a bank signature card were hearsay.'0 In Silva checks were
introduced into evidence not to attest to the truth of any statements made
on the checks, but to show that they had been deposited in a particular
account with a particular bank." Similarly, proponents introduced the
signature card to compare handwriting on the card with the signature of
the defendant's wife.' 2
Under the hearsay rule a court will admit extrajudicial utterances for the
limited purpose of proving the making of the statement.' 3 An example of
such an exception is Western Co. of North America v. Grider.'4 The plain-
tiff in Grider sued Western Company to recover damages for personal inju-
ries he sustained when one of the company's employees struck him with a
high-pressure hose being used to flush out a gas well. The Fort Worth
court of appeals found reversible error in the trial court's excluding testi-
mony of the well's operator, who was an agent and employee of the well
owner.15 The excluded testimony would have established that the operator
told Western Company's employees that a "stalk" was unnecessary. ' 6 The
plaintiff contended at trial that a stalk would have prevented his accident.
The court reasoned that the statement was relevant in the determination of
whether Western Company's employees acted negligently upon hearing
the statement, irrespective of its veracity.' 7 In so holding, the court fol-
lowed the "information acted on" rule enunciated by the Texas Supreme
5. Id. at 331.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 781, at 2.
9. .635 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ reftd).
10. Id. at 777.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., O'Connor v. National Motor Club of Texas, Inc., 385 S.W.2d 558, 561
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, no writ); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 297 S.W.2d
333, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956), rey'don other grounds, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d
370 (1957).
14. 626 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Id. at 926.
16. Id. at 925. A stalk is a rigid tube inserted at the end of the discharge hose into the
sludge pit. The stalk prevents the hose from moving and injuring persons when sudden
bursts of pressure occur.
17. Id. at 926.
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Court in McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp. 18
Once evidence that would be hearsay if offered to prove its truth is ad-
mitted for a different limited purpose, counsel may not argue the truth of
the statements contained therein. 19 In Girard v. State20 state's counsel suc-
cessfully admitted into evidence a suspect's out-of-court statements made
on the telephone to a witness. Counsel represented to the court that the
statements were offered solely for the purpose of proving that the
telelphone call had been made. In closing argument, however, he main-
tained that the out-of-court statements to the witness rebutted the argu-
ment that the state's witness was lying. Reversing the conviction, the court
of criminal appeals reasoned that such argument presented unadmitted
hearsay to the jury, and in a closely contested case, error in permitting
such argument could not be called harmless.2 '
B. Business Records
The legislature has carved out statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule
for purposes of admitting business and other records.22 The court relied on
one of these legislative exceptions in In re GB. B., a Child.23 In that case
the juvenile court transferred a minor to criminal court to stand trial as an
adult on the offense of aggravated robbery. The defendant appealed from
the juvenile court's determination, claiming that the certification investiga-
tion was hearsay and that the court should not have admitted it. The court
of appeals held that when the court clerk testified that she received a report
from the Probation Department pursuant to the court's order for a certifi-
cation investigation, no further predicate was necessary to admit the report
into evidence. 24 The court reasoned that, although certification investiga-
tion reports are ordinarily hearsay, they are admissible at juvenile transfer
hearings as exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Texas Family Code.25
The best known exception to the hearsay rule, and the most commonly
used in Texas is article 3737e, the statutory exception for business
18. 137 Tex. 314, 320, 153 S.W.2d 442, 448 (1941). In McAfee the Texas Supreme Court
found reversible error in the exclusion of McAfee's statements to Joe Woods regarding the
existence and location of certain gas leaks. McAfee went with Woods to the leaky pipeline.
He was showing the leaks to Woods when Woods ignited the match that caused the explo-
sion made the basis of the suit. The defendant pleaded McAfee's contributory negligence in
knowingly going to a place of danger. Such a charge raised the issue of whether McAfee,
under the circumstances, acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted in pointing
out the leaks in the pipeline to Woods. In such a case the information on which McAfee
acted at the time, regardless of its veracity, was admissible as original and material evidence
with regard to the question of contributory negligence.
19. See Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 165.
22. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 373 lb, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(photographic or photostatic copies of business and official records); id. art. 3737e, § I (rec-
ord made in the regular course of business); New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LVIII
(exception to the hearsay rule for "records of regularly conducted activities").
23. 638 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no writ).
24. Id. at 163.
25. Id; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (Vernon 1975).
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records. 26 During the survey period two Texas courts reviewed the propri-
ety of excluding from evidence certain documents that did not satisfy the
requirements of article 3737e. Both courts concluded that in order to take
advantage of the hearsay exception for business records the party offering
the evidence must prove each of the essential elements set out in the
statute.
27
In Texas Employer's Insurance Association v. Sauceda28 the San Antonio
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of a physician's letter to
a representative of the defendant insurance carrier. 29 The court reasoned
that the letter, which discussed the extent of the plaintiffs disability, was
clearly not a routine entry the physician made in the regular course of his
business. 30 The court decided the letter was an attempt to convey an opin-
ion that an outside interested source had elicited. 3' Accordingly, the court
held that the letter did not meet the routine entry requirement of section
l(b) of article 3737e.32 Furthermore, article 3737e requires the record to
be made "at or near the time of the act, event, or condition. '33 The San
Antonio court found that the doctor's letter to the defendant failed this test
because the physician sent the letter approximately four months after last
examining the plaintiff.34 Even if the letter had complied with the statu-
tory predicates of article 3737e, the court found that the letter was inad-
missible as an "expert conjecture" that did not rest on demonstrative
medical facts and about which there could be a genuine dispute among
doctors. 35 The court explained that because article 3737e deprives the op-
ponent of the right to cross-examine, the exception to the hearsay rule is
26. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar as rele-
vant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or event or the exist-
ence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or represen-
tative of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or
condition to make such memorandum or record or to transmit infor-
mation thereof to be included in such memorandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
27. See Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Sauceda, 636 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Ct. App.-San
Antonio 1982, no writ); Haney v. Duncan Dev. Inc., 626 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1981), rev'd, 634 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
28. 636 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
29. Id. at 500.
30. Id. at 499.
31. Id. Admission into evidence of a similar letter was held reversible error by another
Texas court during the survey period in Associated Indem. Corp. v. Dixon, 632 S.W.2d 833
(Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
32. 636 S.W.2d at 499.
33. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § I(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
34. 636 S.W.2d at 499.
35. Id. The court cited Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. 1966). Another
case during the survey period excluded, as "expert conjectures" under Loper, findings in a
physician's records that the appellant had recovered from his illness, had been discharged
from the doctor's care, was capable of doing the same work as before his injury, and had
suffered no permanent disability. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 624 S.W.2d 698,
701 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
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justified only if the diagnosis or other information rests on reasonable
medical certainty. 36 An opinion based upon conjecture, speculation, and
expert medical opinion will not justify the waiver of the valuable right of
cross-examination, particularly when records are genuinely in dispute. 37
In order for a record to escape the hearsay rule under article 3737e the
record must be made by a person with personal knowledge of the facts he
records. 38 Whether plaintiffs' invoices met this qualification was the issue
in Haney v. Duncan Development, Inc.39 In this contract action the plain-
tiffs' accountant attempted to testify to the cost of constructing the build-
ings by offering into evidence invoices submitted by subcontractors. The
accountant was unable to identify who prepared the invoices or to state
whether the invoices' author had personal knowledge of the work per-
formed. The Beaumont court of appeals had that the accountant was un-
able to lay the necessary predicate under article 3737e to admit into
evidence the records that would have formed the basis of his testimony.4 °
The Texas Supreme Court reversed this ruling, finding that an on-site su-
pervisor who had personal knowledge of the activities at its construction
site could reliably confirm the accuracy of the submitted invoices.4' The
supreme court held that in light of this "qualifying testimony" the invoices
became part of the plaintiffs' record of its subcontractors' activity and
charges and qualified for admission into evidence under article 3737.42
C Statements as to Pedigree and Family History
One of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule admits into evidence,
under certain conditions, statements concerning family history, such as the
date and place of marriages, births, and deaths of family members, and
other facts relating to descent and family relationships.43 Declarations of
the person whose family situation is at issue are admissible, as are declara-
tions made by other close family members." Some courts admit such
statements by nonfamily members with close relationships to the family.45
36. 636 S.W.2d at 499.
37. Id.; Reed v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § I(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
39. 626 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981), rev'd, 634 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.
1982).
40. 626 S.W.2d at 65.
41. 634 S.W.2d at 813.
42. Id. at 813-14.
43. IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1341, at 508-09; see also New Rules, supra note I, 641
S.W.2d at LX (rule 803(19) allows admissions of evidence of "reputation concerning per-
sonal and family history"); id, at LX1 (rule 804(b)(3) allows a "statement of personal or
family history"); id. at LIX (rules 803(12) and 803(13) codify exceptions to the hearsay rule
for marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates, and for family records).
44. IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1343, at 511-12.
45. See Lewis v. Bergess, 54 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ) (admit declara-
tions of a friend who accompanied deceased to the Mexican War that deceased served in the
army and died there unmarried). Although there is no unanimity of thought of how close
the relationship must be, old servants, family physicians, and intimate friends have been
allowed to testify under this exception. See IA R. RAy, supra note 3, § 1343, at 511-12.
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These statements are admissible, however, only when the proponent shows
that the declarant is unavailable. 46 Two Texas courts considered this ex-
ception during this survey period, and their rulings illustrate the circum-
stances under which courts will admit declarations of pedigree and family
history.
In Pouncy v. Garner47 the appellee claimed she was the intestate's heir.
To prove her allegation she elicted testimony regarding a certain marriage
to show that her ancestor was the intestate's aunt. The Tyler court of ap-
peals determined that the testimony fell within the family history excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.48 The trial court in Lopez t. Texas Department of
Human Resources49 sustained a hearsay objection to a question asking a
witness if he knew who was the father of a certain child. The Corpus
Christi court of appeals affirmed the ruling because the defendant failed to
show that the declarant was dead or otherwise unavailable.5 0 The court
further reasoned that sustaining the objection was especially correct in
view of the fact that the same testimony was elicited from the defendant on
direct examination.5'
D. Admissions of Party-Opponents
A distinction exists between two frequently confused exceptions to the
hearsay rule: the "declarations against interest" exception and the "admis-
sions of parties" exception.5 2 Admissions of party-opponents are admissi-
ble into evidence without satisfying any of the requirements for
declarations against interest.5 3 Such admissions do not need to be against
the interest of the party when made, and the party making the admission
need not be, and rarely will be, unavailable.5 4 Finally, the rule does not
require the party making the admission to have personal knowledge of the
fact admitted.5 5 In CF & I Steel Corp. v. Pete Sublett & Co.56 the court
reversed the trial court's decision to admit into evidence a statement by a
representative of the defendant manufacturer. 57 The appeals court ruled
that in the absence of a showing that the representative had the authority
to make the communication on the specific subject, the statement was not
46. Wolf v. Wilhelm, 146 S.W. 216, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1912, error
ref'd).
47. 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 340.
49. 631 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Ct. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
50. Id. at 252. For a discussion of this requirement, see Bowden v. Caldron, 554
S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. 631 S.W.2d at 252.
52. See IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1122, at 270-73; see also New Rules, supra note 1,
641 S.W.2d at LVI (rule 801(e)(2) defines admissions of party-opponents); id. (rule 803(24)
defines statements against interest).
53. See IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1122, at 270-73.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 623 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 716.
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admissible as an admission of a party-opponent.58 An example of an ad-
mission of a party-opponent is the statement the appellant in Grimes v.
Jalco, Inc.59 made to the Industrial Accident Board. In that case the
Houston [1st District] appeals court held that the appellant's statement in
the hearing that he was the defendant's employee was a party admission
and, therefore, a proper subject for impeachment on cross-examination. 60
Noting that the statement was also an admission against interest, the court
held that this admission against interest by a party-opponent was not a
judicial admission, and therefore, was not conclusive. 6'
. Judicial Admissions
A fact judicially admitted does not require evidence and establishes as a
matter of law the fact admitted, precluding a trial court from finding any
contrary facts.62 Thus, in Concrete Construction Supply, Inc. v. M.FC,
Inc.63 the Dallas court of appeals found the counsel's stipulation that a
certain sum was due and owing established that fact as a matter of law. 64
The exception to the hearsay rule for admissions allows admissions by
the party's agent. An attorney, as his client's agent, has authority to enter
into stipulations and agreements respecting evidence to be offered at
trial.65 Although a client may restrict the authority of his attorney to act, a
federal district court in Texas indicated that at the time issues regarding
evidentiary stipulations arise, the client must advise the other parties and
the court of such special limitations on the usual attorney-client relation-
ship.66 In United States v. Texas the state attempted to withdraw eviden-
tiary stipulations to which the state's Assistant Attorney General had
agreed.67 The court refused to allow the withdrawal because it found that
the state's counsel had made and filed the stipulation with the court more
than nineteen months earlier, had later reaffirmed the stipulation in open
court, and wanted to withdraw the agreement only because the state re-
gretted its tactical decision.68 The court reasoned that evidentiary stipula-
tions may be withdrawn only upon a showing that manifest injustice
would otherwise result.69 As the litigation process proceeds, a party seek-
ing to alter or withdraw stipulations necessarily encounters a greater bur-
58. Id.
59. 630 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
60. Id. at 284; see Guzman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 564 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
61. 630 S.W.2d at 284.
62. IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1147, at 299-300. The Texas Supreme Court established
five requirements for judicial admissions in Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 201,
338 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960). This opinion, as well as the strong dissent by four justices,
contains a comprehensive discussion of the nuances involved in judicial admissions.
63. 636 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
64. Id. at 477-78.
65. Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv., 263 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959).
66. United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 712 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
67. Id. at 709.
68. Id. at 714.
69. Id. at 713.
19831
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den in order to protect the integrity of the process.70 The court held that if
a party does not protest an agreement made by his attorney within a rea-
sonable amount of time, the client may be found to have constructively
ratified the agreement. 7'
In another case involving the scope of judicial admissions, the Beau-
mont court of appeals refused to hold that the defendant's introduction of
the plaintiffs interrogatory answer was a judicial admission.72 In Williams
v. 3 Beall Bros. 3 Inc. the plaintiff contended that the introduction by the
defendant of the plaintiffs interrogatories, in which the plaintiff described
her medical expenses, waived the plaintiff's burden to prove such expenses.
The court reasoned that a statement made for the purpose of giving testi-
mony is not a judicial admission.73
F Excited Utterances
Another well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule is the exception
for statements made while in the grip of violent emotion, excitement, or
pain. The rationale for this exception is that a person in an excited condi-
tion loses his capacity for the reflection necessary to fabricate a false-
hood.74 Thus, in King v. State75 the court held a rape victim's complaint,
also referred to as outcry, to be admissible in the state's case in chief as
direct evidence of that complaint. 76 Furthermore, the court held that out-
cry is admissible without regard to its spontaneity. 77 The Houston [14th
District] court of appeals in Lewis v. State78 held that a defendant's confes-
sion made while he was in police custody was an excited utterance because
he was in a highly emotional state when he made the statement.79
The Dallas appeals court explained the proper predicate for the excited
utterance exception in Haney Electric v. Hurst.8° The trial court excluded
testimony as to the statement of the driver of a fourth vehicle allegedly
involved in a multi-vehicle accident. 8' The supreme court has held that to
prove a statement is an excited utterance the proponant of the evidence
must establish the exciting event by independent proof.82 The plaintiffs in
70. Id.; see Downs v. American Employers Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir.
1970).
71. 523 F. Supp. at 713.
72. Williams v. 3 BeaU Bros. 3 Inc., 628 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982,
writ ref d n.r.e.).
73. Id. at 532.
74. See Johnson v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 250, 251, 8 S.W.2d 127, 128 (1928); see also
New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LVII (rule 803(2) codifies the admissibility of ex-
cited utterances).
75. 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
76. Id. at 491.
77. Id.; see also Ortega v. State, 462 S.W.2d 296, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); IA R.
RAY, supra note 3, § 927, at 187.
78. 630 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
79. Id. at 288.
80. 624 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ dism'd).
81. Id. at 605-06.
82. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 173-75 (Tex. 1963).
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Hurst contended that the defendants did not meet this requirement be-
cause they did not prove that the collision involved the witness's vehicle.
The court disagreed, explaining that the reason for requiring an exciting
event is to establish trustworthiness of the utterance.83 The court further
stated that the evidence established beyond question the occurrence of an
exciting event, irrespective of whether it included a collision with the wit-
ness's vehicle.84
In Lambert v. Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc.85 the court found that an
alleged post-accident statement by defendant's employee was inadmissible
as an excited utterance.8 6 The court reasoned that the employee was not a
witness to the accident, but arrived on the scene after the plaintiff had
reported the accident to the defendant.8 7
G. Reputation
Reputation evidence is admissible to prove character when personal
character is in controversy. 88 In Mixon v. State8 9 the Dallas court of ap-
peals ruled that the inability of the prosecution's reputation witnesses to
identify the defendant in court did not render them unqualified to testify
as to the defendant's reputation in the community.90 The court reasoned
that a witness who knows of an accused's general reputation need not be
personally acquainted with him in order to testify as a reputation
witness. 9 '
When a witness testifies to his personal knowledge of someone's charac-
ter, rather than to that person's reputation in the community, he is not a
reputation witness. 92 In contrast to reputation testimony, testimony based
on personal knowledge of someone's character may not be discredited by a
question of whether he has heard other rumors of acts inconsistent with
that reputation. 93 On this issue the same court explained in another case
that to allow "have you heard" questions to be asked a witness who is not
a reputation witness would prejudice the jury by letting them hear rumors
of otherwise inadmissible misconduct by the defendant. 94
Although one's general reputation in the community is always based
upon hearsay, reputation evidence can be based on inadmissible hearsay,
83. 624 S.W.2d at 606.
84. Id.
85. 626 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
86. Id. at 848.
87. Id.
88. IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1324, at 500-01; see also New Rules, supra note 1, 641
S.W.2d at XXXIX-XL (admissibility of character evidence, rule 404); id. at XL (admissibil-
ity of reputation evidence, rule 405(a); id. at LII (admissibility of evidence of character and
conduct of witness, rule 608); id. at LX (admissibility of reputation as to character, rule
803(21)).
89. 632 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd).
90. Id. at 839.
91. Id.
92. Ward v. State, 591 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
93. Long v. State, 631 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
94. Penegraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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as in Arnold v. State.95 In Arnold the Beaumont court of appeals reversed
the trial court's decision to admit a federal parole officer's testimony of the
defendant's bad reputation. 96 The court found such testimony to be hear-
say because the testimony rested on written documents not on record, and
because the officer admitted that he had based his testimony on written
documents of prior legal problems.97 The court ruled that whatever ap-
peared in the documents constituted out-of-court statements offered to
prove their truth and, thus, were inadmissible. 98
II. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Admissibility
An expert witness may draw inferences that a jury is not competent to
draw from facts in evidence.99 To justify the use of expert opinion testi-
mony, the subject of the inference or conclusion must be beyond the
knowledge of the typical layman.' The witness must also have sufficient
skill, knowledge, or experience within the particular field to make it ap-
pear that he is qualified to express an opinion.' 0 ' The trial courts have
tremendous discretion in determining the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony, and an appeals court will not disturb the court's decision to
admit or exclude expert opinion testimony absent an abuse of
discretion. ' 0 2
During this survey period the Corpus Christi court of appeals found that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony by
licensed attorneys on the issue of representation of confficting interests. 10 3
The Fort Worth court of appeals found a trial court justified in excluding
testimony of a drilling company's employees as to the cause of an acci-
dent. 104 The employee's only qualifications as experts were that they had
worked as roughnecks and drillers on other rigs. Similarly, the Houston
[14th District] court of appeals found that a trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing expert medical testimony in a suit arising from
plaintiffs purchase of a cockatoo that died three weeks later. 0 5 The court
found the plaintiffs expert witnesses qualified to testify as experts even
though neither was a veterinarian or a pathologist. 16 The court reasoned
95. 636 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, no writ).
96. Id. at 791-92.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 791.
99. 2 R. RAY, Supra note 3, § 1400, at 23-27; see New Rules, supra note 1,641 S.W.2d at
LV (rules 701-705 govern opinion testimony by expert and lay witnesses).
100. 2 R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1400 at 23-27.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 1401, at 28; see Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tex. 1967).
103. Dillard v. Broyles, 633 S.W.2d 636, 643-44 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. Hutson v. Search Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth
1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
105. Bormaster v. Henderson, 624 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.)
1981, no writ).
106. Id. at 659.
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that both witnesses and microbiologists/parasitologists, and that they had
restricted their testimony to the characteristics of microfilariae, the alleged
cause of the cockatoo's death. 107 Another appeals court found an abuse of
discretion when the trial court excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs ex-
pert witness.10 8 The witness testified that he had used the width of the
plaintiffs shoulder area to calculate the appropriate radiation dosage that
the plaintiff should have received. The court ruled that such testimony
ought to have been admitted if properly proved because it was within the
expertise of plaintiffs expert witness, a physicist.109
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Lucas 0 is a significant opinion in which the
Houston [14th District] court of appeals found that the trial court had
abused its discretion when it allowed expert testimony of an economist
whose name had not been disclosed in discovery."' Prior to trial, Texas
Industries had directed an interrogatory to the appellee, seeking the iden-
tity of any experts he expected to call at trial. The appellee first answered
that it would call an economist, but when the appellant requested the ex-
pert's identity the appellee responded that no expert would testify. The
court found that the parties went to trial with the understanding that no
expert would testify. During the trial, the appellee asked for leave to call
an economist. The trial court allowed the testimony on the condition that
Texas Industries would first have an opportunity to depose the expert.
Texas Industries took the expert's deposition the night before he testified in
court. Texas Industries asserted that it did not have sufficient time to pre-
pare for cross-examination of the expert and that his testimony, which al-
legedly influenced the jury's findings with respect to loss of future earning
capacity, should not have been admitted. The court of appeals found that
allowing the expert to testify absent the showing of a compelling reason for
the testimony was an abuse of discretion." 12
B. Basis for Expert Opinion
An expert may not base his opinion testimony" 1 3 solely on hearsay. The
statements or report on which the expert bases his opinion must be prop-
erly in evidence and must be the type of information on which experts in
the same field customarily rely." 4 During this survey period the court in
Young v. Members Life Insurance Co. 15 held that an expert may predicate
107. Id.
108. Wynn v. Mid-Cities Clinic, 628 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1981,
writ refd n.r.e.).
109. Id.
110. 634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
111. Id. at 758.
112. Id. The approach taken by the court was, in part, a response to the trial court's
failure to impose a sanction for lack of compliance with a discovery rule.
113. 2 R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1400, at 23-27.
114. Moore v. Grantham, 599 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. 1980); see also New Rules, supra
note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LV (rule 703 defines bases of opinion testimony).
115. 624 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
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his opinion testimony upon both personal knowledge and hearsay. 1 6 In
Young the physician reviewed the deceased's insurance policy application
before testifying as an expert witness. The application was an exhibit in
evidence. The deceased's medical records and the autopsy report about
which the doctor testified were also in evidence. The physician had per-
sonal knowledge of the company's criteria for reviewing applications, but
because his opinion stemmed from information given him by a company
underwriter, it was based in part upon hearsay. The El Paso court of ap-
peals held the doctor's testimony admissible, reasoning that his testimony
indicated that he based his opinion upon his medical experience and back-
ground, the company's criteria of which he had personal knowledge, the
application and policy, both of which were in evidence, and also upon his
discussions with the reviewing underwriter." 17 The court held that such a
combination of personal knowledge, statements in the record, and hearsay
constituted a valid predicate for expert testimony." 18
C Standard of Care
Two cases during the survey period reiterated the established principle
that a defendant physician's own testimony can establish the standard of
care applicable to his case. The Texas Supreme Court in Roark v. Allen "9
opined that the defendant physician can establish the standard of care, and
that lay eyewitness testimony can establish a departure from that standard.
In Roark the father, who was present at his child's birth, testified at trial
that he saw one of the defendant physicians apply forceps over the child's
shoulders and lock the forceps handles above the child's body. According
to the codefendant, the shape of the forceps made it impossible for the
forceps blades to fit over the child's head. He testified that forceps "are
just not used in that manner." The supreme court interpreted the doctor's
testimony to mean that a physician cannot fit the forceps around a child's
head in the way forceps are meant to fit.' 20 This testimony, the court con-
cluded was some evidence of the standard of care to be used in delivering a
frank breech birth with the aid of forceps.' 2' The supreme court further
found that the father's description of the birth was some evidence of a
breach of that standard. 22
The Houston [1st District] court of appeals continued the trend of the
last several years in eroding the standard of care distinctions between spe-
cialities and between physicians in various geographical areas. In Garza v.
Keillor123 the court ruled that a Dallas physician can testify to medical
standards in Harlingen provided that he shows sufficient familarity with
116. Id. at 823.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 633 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1982).
120. Id. at 811.
121. d.
122. Id.
123. 623 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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such standards. 24 The Garza court further held that the testimony of an
internist regarding the infection process is admissible in a medical mal-
practice suit against orthopedic surgeons. 125
D. Owner's Opinion as to Value
A property owner can testify as to his opinion of the property's value
even though he would not be qualified to testify as an expert to the value
of the same property if owned by another person. ' 26 In Tom Benson Chev-
rolet, Inc. v. Alvarado 127 a consumer sued a car dealer for violation of the
Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act. The trial court al-
lowed the plaintiff, who bought an automobile, to testify as to her opinion
of the automobile's value. Based on the plaintiffs testimony, the jury re-
turned a verdict in her favor. The San Antonio court of appeals explained
that the law does not require an owner to testify specifically as to the "rea-
sonable market value" of a car in order to support a jury's finding on prop-
erty value.' 28 In Baker v. Baker,129 however, neither the husband nor the
wife stated they knew the market value of the diamond. Thus, they failed
to meet the standard, which an owner of goods must satisfy, to show they
were qualified to testify to the diamond's value.' 30 Accordingly, the Hous-
ton [14th District] court of appeals ruled that the jury's answer on the dia-
mond's value was not supported by evidence.' 3'
E Cross-Examination of Experts
An expert witness may properly be examined as to his knowledge of
treatises, books, scientific journals, and other works and be asked whether
he agrees with them.' 32 A cross-examiner, however, may use such publica-
tions to impeach the witness only if the witness recognizes them as authori-
tative. 133 In National Surety Corp. v. Rushing' 34 the plaintiffs expert
witness was a chiropractor who testified that he read chiropractic, but not
medical journals. On cross-examination the attorney asked the chiroprac-
tor the following question: "Have you ever read an article entitled 'Mal-
practice is an Inevitable Result of Chiropractic Philosophy, and Tragic'?"
The trial court sustained an objection, which was affirmed on appeal. Ac-
124. Id. at 671.
125. Id.
126. Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); Barstow v. Jackson, 429 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1968, no writ); see also New Rules, supra note 1,641 S.W.2d at LV (rule 701 defines
permissible opinion testimony by lay witnesses).
127. 636 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
128. Id. at 823.
129. 624 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
130. Id. at 799.
131. Id. The Baker court ruled that the erroneous assessment of the value of one piece
of property was not enough to establish that the property division as a whole was manifestly
unjust. Id.
132. 2 R. RAY, supra note 3, § 1403, at 38.
133. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 6, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (1949).
134. 628 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
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cording to the Beaumont court of appeals, until the witness had recognized
the authority or the author of the treatise, the court could not allow any
evidence about the article.135
F Court-Appointed Expert
In Ross v. Walsh 136 an ousted partner in a partnership dissolution suit
complained on appeal that the trial court had erred in denying her motion
to cross-examine the court-appointed appraiser. She argued that the ap-
praiser's report was hearsay, that the appointment of the appraiser made
him the court's expert witness, and that the testimony of this expert was the
sole basis for determining the value of the appellee's partnership interest.
The Houston [14th District] court of appeals disagreed, pointing out that
the appraiser served at the trial court's discretion and that his report was
intended solely to aid the court. 137 The court held that the appraiser was
not an expert witness.' 38 The court reasoned that counsel is not privy to a
judge's private research, and the appellant would not have demanded the
right of cross-examination if the judge, instead of the appraiser, had com-
piled the report. 139 On the hearsay argument the Ross court stated that the
appraiser had prepared his report solely for the use of the court;140 no one
had introduced the report into evidence, therefore, it could not be
hearsay. 14
G. Reasonable Medical Probability
The trier of fact usually determines the issue of causation even when
expert testimony demonstrates probable cause.' 42 Expert testimony that
an event is a possible cause of the condition is not evidence of reasonable
medical probability unless no other causal evidence is produced and the
condition more likely than not resulted from the event. 143 In Valdez v.
Lyman-Roberts Hospital, Inc. 44 the appellants' expert medical witness tes-
tified that proper diagnosis and stabilization of a patient with the dece-
dent's symptons were essential to the patient's chances of survival. The
doctor further testified that, although a ruptured uterus is not a common
occurrence, the symptoms incident to it are common. The expert stated
that any modem obstetric unit, including small ones, should have the facil-
ities to handle a surgical catastrophe involving a pregnant woman within
thirty-five to forty minutes. The trial court found that this testimony was
not evidence of causation and granted defendants' motions for an in-
135. Id. at 92-93.
136. 629 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
137. Id. at 826.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited IA R. RAY, supra note 3, § 781, at 2.
142. Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970).
143. Id. at 707.
144. 638 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
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structed verdict. On appeal the defendants argued that the deceased wo-
man's family bore the burden of proving that proper diagnosis and
treatment could have been made at the time in question under the same or
similar circumstances. The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the
appellants satisfied this burden by establishing that no doctor had been
called to aid the decedent and by the expert's testimony that the decedent
could have been alive today had she received proper care and treatment. 145
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court
held that the doctor's testimony was sufficient evidence of medical causa-
tion, entitling the plaintiffs to have a jury determine whether the decedent
could have received proper medical treatment. 146
III. PAROL EVIDENCE
In Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley 147 the Texas Supreme Court, construing an oil
and gas lease, reiterated the basic Texas parol evidence rule. The parol
evidence rule circumscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret a
writing. The court may allow extrinsic evidence only if it finds the con-
tract to be ambiguous.' 48 The rule also prohibits parol evidence if the
writing is intergrated. 149 In Clause v. Gyorkey' 50 the Fifth Circuit dis-
cussed whether a memorandum stating employment terms was an inte-
grated agreement. In that case an Austrian physician brought a civil
action for damages against the chief of laboratory services at a hospital
and its affiliated college of medicine. The physician alleged that the de-
fendants misrepresented the employment terms that induced him to come
to the United States. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and the plaintiff appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision.' 5' The
plaintiff offered into evidence a memorandum containing the employment
145. Id. at 116.
146. Id. at 116-17.
147. 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981).
148. Id. at 732. Compare Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 635 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (term "surgery to the back" held unambiguous in
the absence of evidence to show mutual mistake), and Anderson v. Gilliland, 624 S.W.2d
243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (testimony of widow, contents of the
grantor's will, and closeness of the execution of the deed and the will all held to be inadmis-
sible on the question of grantor's intent in executing a clear and unambiguous quitclaim
deed), with Startex Drilling Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 680 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1982) (con-
tract for drilling two wells ambiguous with respect to whether footage or day rate payment
would be collected by contractor); Richard Plantation Co. v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 671 F.2d
154 (5th Cir. 1982) (mineral lessee agreed to pay the landowner 1/8 royalty and in another
agreement agreed to an additional royalty; agreement held ambiguous as to whether the
proportionate reduction clause in the original lease applied to the additional royalty), and
Weber v. French, 635 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.) (handwritten notation contained in provision of builder's and mechanic's lien contract
ambiguous).
149. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction in a final written agreement
that is intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See 2 R. RAY, supra note
3, § 1602, at 312-14.
150. 674 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 436.
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terms on which he relied. In a footnote the Fifth Circuit addressed
whether this was the entire and complete employment agreement between
the parties. The court characterized the writing as an internal administra-
tive memorandum and noted that it was only one of a series of written
communications between the parties. 52 Indicating that the one writing
could be considered the entire agreement only with difficulty, the court
chose to err on the side of caution and considered the plaintiffs employ-
ment in light of all the communications between the parties.'
5 3
In Schlipf v. Exxon Corp. 1 4 the Houston [14th District] court of appeals
reiterated the exception that parol evidence is admissible to show that the
payee on a note fraudulently induced the maker to sign the note. 5 5 The El
Paso court of appeals explained that the parol evidence rule does not apply
to agreements the parties make subsequent to the written agreement in
question; 5 6 nor does the parol evidence rule prevent the parties from mod-
ifying a written instrument by an oral agreement even if the written agree-
ment provides that it can be modified only by a writing. 157
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
During the survey period Texas courts continued to define the parame-
ters of judicial notice. 58 One court held that Texas courts will take judi-
cial notice of public laws.' 59 The same appellate court held that a trial
court is entitled to take judicial notice of the mounting cost of living in
inflationary times in determining whether to modify a divorce decree by
increasing monthly child support payments. 160
In most judicial notice cases Texas appellate courts did not question
whether a fact was a proper subject for judicial notice, but whether judicial
notice had been properly requested of the trial court, and if so, what effect
it had on the burden of proof. In American Insurance Co. v. Reed 16 1 the
plaintiff alleged various violations of the Texas Insurance Board's rules
and regulations. The plaintiff introduced none of the rules or regulations
into evidence, nor did he ask the trial court to take judicial notice of them.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the trial court could have taken judicial
152. Id. at 434 n.5 (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. 626 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 78.
156. Mar-Lan Indus., Inc. v. Nelson, 635 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982,
no writ).
157. Id.
158. The supreme court addressed the scope and subject matter ofjudicial notice, as wen
as the manner, time, and discretion of the court in their new evidence rules. See New Rules,
supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XXXVII-XXXVIII.
159. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Toman, 624 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort
Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). The court of appeals stated that since the Texas Water Code
was cited in both the plaintiffs petition and defendants' plea in abatement, no additional
evidence was required to bring it to the court's attention. Id. at 680.
160. Smallwood v. Smallwood, 625 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no
writ).
161. 626 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
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notice of the regulations because they were cited in a Texas Supreme
Court opinion. The Eastland court of appeals held that a trial court can-
not take judicial notice of regulations that are pleaded, but not introduced
into evidence. 162 Similarly, in Galvan v. United States Fire Insurance
Co .163 the plaintiff failed to request the trial court to take judicial notice of
the trial evidence in making its ruling on his inability to pay any appeal
costs. He argued on appeal, however, that the trial court was entitled to
take judicial notice of such evidence. Finding this to be an improper use
of judicial notice, the Amarillo court of appeals ruled that a trial court
should not resort to judicial notice to assist a plaintiff in discharging a
burden he did not meet, particularly when the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure commit the trial court to determine plaintiffs financial ability
initially. 164
In Folsom Investments, Inc. v. Troutz 165 the plaintiff timely requested
and received judicial notice of standard mortality tables. The plaintiff,
however, offered no evidence of the potential value of the deceased child's
services until he reached his majority, nor of the expenses he would have
incurred in raising the child. The Fort Worth court of appeals held that
the mortality tables alone were insufficient to support an award for pecuni-
ary loss resulting from the death of a child. 166
V. IMPEACHMENT
In Haney Electric Co. v. Hurst 167 the trial court excluded defense wit-
nesses who would have given causation testimony. The basis of the court's
ruling was that the testimony would have been inconsistent with the opin-
ion of the defendants' expert. Finding the exclusion to be reversible error,
the court of appeals explained that the resolution of conflicts and inconsis-
tencies in the testimony of a witness or between witnesses is within the
province of the jury.168 Furthermore, the court held that a party is not
bound by the testimony of his own witnesses and may introduce and rely
on contrary testimony. 169 In a similar case the trial court allowed the
plaintiff-appellant to contradict orally a document that he had previously
offered into evidence. The exhibit, a memorandum authored by the de-
fendant bank's loan officer, stated that the plaintiff had suggested transfer-
ring his personal debt to a corporation. At trial the plaintiff testified, over
defendant's objection, that the loan officer had suggested the transfer. The
162. Id. at 903. Rule 201(d) of the proposed Texas evidence rules provides that judicial
notice is mandatory if requested by a party and if the court is supplied with the "necessary
information." New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XXXVIII (emphasis added).
163. 629 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
164. Id. at 213; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 355.
165. 632 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
166. Id. at 876-77.
167. 624 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ dism'd).
168. Id. at 609.
169. Id. In so holding, the court relied on Englebrecht v. W.D. Brannan & Sons, 501
S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Cecil, 285 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Tyler court of appeals held the admission of such testimony was not er-
ror, 170 citing the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Gevinson v. Manhattan
Construction Co.' 7' In Gevinson the court wrote that "[i]n analogy to the
rule that a party may prove the truth of particular facts in direct contradic-
tion to the testimony of his witness, he may also disprove factual recitals in
a document introduced by him."' 72
As a general proposition, extraneous offenses are inadmissible to attack
the credibility of witnesses. 173 In Holden v. State174 the court found that
the defendant's statement that he had never been "in trouble" opened the
door to cross-examination of an extraneous offense. 75 Similarly, in Beas-
ley v. State 76 the court of criminal appeals found that appellant's testi-
mony on direct examination denying that he had "ever done anything like
that before" permitted cross-examination regarding other offenses.' 77
In an interesting twist to the application of the prior convictions im-
peachment rule, the court denied the defendant-appellant in Feist v.
State 178 the right to disclose to the jury that he was a convicted felon and
had served time in prison. 179 On appeal the state argued that such evi-
dence is only relevant as impeachment evidence. The Beaumont court of
appeals disagreed, holding that the exclusion was error. 80 The court rea-
soned that:
[e]very lawyer for an accused strives to clothe his client with an air of
credibility, one criteria [sic] being complete candor. Knowing that his
client is subject to cross-examination as to prior convictions, the wit-
ness is in a much better position before the jury if the blight of his
character is shown on direct examination.' 8'
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, however, and held that such
error did not amount to reversible error in view of the testimony of three
prosecution witnesses who positively identified the defendant as the
robber. '8 2
VI. PRIVILEGES
Several courts reiterated the vitality and fragility of certain evidentiary
170. Shook v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 627 S.W.2d 741, 752 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982,
writ granted).
171. Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1969). The proposed
Texas rule of evidence 607 provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him." New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LII.
172. 449 S.W.2d at 466.
173. Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also New Rules,
supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XL (rule 404(b) governs evidence of "other wrongs or acts"); id.
at LII-LIII (rule 609 governs impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime).
174. 628 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
175. Id. at 167.
176. 634 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
177. Id. at 322.
178. 631 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, no writ).
179. Id. at 771.
180. Id.
181. Id. (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 772.
[Vol. 37
EVIDENCE
privileges. 8 3 In Eloise Bauer & Associates v. Electronic Realty Associ-
ates18 4 the court noted the well-established rule that failure to assert a
privilege when a question is asked waives the privilege.' 8 5 In this case the
attorney-client privilege apparently would have protected a letter written
by Electronic Realty Associates from discovery had it not been voluntarily
produced.' 8 6 The Texarkana court of appeals rejected the appellee's argu-
ment that the letter had been accidentally produced and that accidental
production does not operate as a waiver.' 8 7 The court found it undisputed
that the exhibit was voluntarily produced for appellant's inspection and
that there was no evidence tending to show that its production was either
accidental or inadvertent. 8 8 Similarly, in Bendele v. Tri- County Farmer's
Co-op '8 9 the San Antonio court of appeals restated the principle that a
party waives the attorney-client privilege when he complies without objec-
tion to a pretrial court order requiring production of privileged matter.' 90
Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of the seller's credit policy on the basis of its attorney-client privi-
lege, because the seller had waived the privilege.' 9 '
The Corpus Christi court of appeals refused to carve out an exception to
the statutory patient-psychologist privilege.' 92 In a suit brought by the
father to modify the original custody order, the father complained on ap-
peal that he had been prohibited from cross-examining the mother's psy-
chologist concerning her sexual attitudes. The court held that it was not
error to prohibit such cross-examination because the mother had signed no
waiver of the privilege and the statute did not provide for implied waiver
in child custody cases. 93
VII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
During the survey period several courts considered when and under
what circumstances the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply. In WB.
Harmon v. Sohio Pipeline Co. '94 the Texas Supreme Court, noting that it
183. For the scope, effect, and waiver of privileges in the supreme court's proposed rules
see New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XLI-LI.
184. 621 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
185. Id. at 204.
186. See New rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at L (rule 511 codifies the waiver of privi-
lege by voluntary disclosure).
187. For this proposition appellee cited Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1960, no writ).
188. 621 S.W.2d at 204.
189. 635 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds,
afdin part, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 20 (Oct. 9, 1982).
190. 635 S.W.2d at 464.
191. Id.
192. In re T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd); see
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, §§ 2(a), 4 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The new Texas
rules of evidence contain both a physician/patient privilege and a privilege for mental
health information. New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XLVI-L.
193. In re T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ
dism'd).
194. 623 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1981).
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does not have jurisdiction to review questions of factual insufficiency of
the evidence, stated that it possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the
court of appeals applied the proper rules of law. 195 In Harmon the plain-
tiff brought suit against Sohio to recover for damages to plaintiff's land
caused by an oil spill. It was undisputed that the oil spill occurred as the
result of a gasket failure on a valve of Sohio's pipeline. Sohio did not
object to the trial court's inclusion of a res ipsa loquitur instruction in the
charge to the jury. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the trial court
rendered judgment. The court of appeals held that the evidence was factu-
ally insufficient to support the jury finding of negligence on the part of
Sohio, regardless of the application of res ipsa loquitur. 96 The plaintiff
argued before the supreme court that, assuming proper application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff had no need to introduce evidence
of specific acts of negligence. The supreme court agreed and held that the
court of appeals misapplied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in arriving at
its conclusion.197
In Cuellar v. Garcia' 98 the Austin court of appeals agreed with the trial
court's refusal to submit a res ipsa loquitur instruction. Cuellar was a
wrongful death and survival action against the driver of a car that crashed
into a house, killing a man who had been sitting on the front porch. The
court reasoned that res ipsa loquitur has no application when, as in Cuel-
lar, the evidence conclusively establishes the facts surrounding the acci-
dent, leaving no room for inferences.199
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply the plaintiff must show that
the instrumentality producing the injury was under the defendant's exclu-
sive control or management. 200 In Lambert v. Gearhart-Owen Industries,
Inc. 2° ' the court found that such prerequisite to the applicability of the
doctrine was not established. In Lambert the plaintiffs employee was
driving the defendant's truck at the time of the accident. The plaintiff tes-
tified that he was not in the truck at the time of the accident and thus had
no way of knowing what happened inside the truck. He admitted that the
employee's foot could possibly have slipped off the clutch, causing the
truck to jump forward. The Corpus Christi court of appeals thus reasoned
that the plaintiff had not established the "control" necessary to invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.202
195. 623 S.W.2d at 314-15; see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1728 (Vernon 1982-1983).
196. Sohio Pipeline Co. v. W.B. Harmon, 613 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1981).
197. 623 S.W.2d at 316.
198. 621 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. Id. at 647.
200. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974).
201. 626 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
202. Id. at 848.
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VIII. ADMISSIBILITY
A. Settlement
The courts have carved out several exceptions to the general rule that
evidence of settlement agreements should be excluded from the jury. 20 3
For example, settlement agreements in which a settling defendant will re-
ceive a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery from the other defendants are
admissible in Texas courts. 2°4 This exception permits the remaining de-
fendants to discredit the settling defendant because he has a financial stake
in the success of the plaintiffs recovery. Evidence of a defendant's offer to
settle a dispute may also be admitted as a defense against the imposition of
attorney's fees. 20
5
B. Best Evidence
The underlying purpose of the best evidence rule is to secure the most
reliable information as to the contents of documents when those terms are
disputed. 206 In Hodges v. Peden20 7 the Houston [14th District] court of
appeals held that when handwritten records are transcribed into a com-
puter that records the information and prepares a computerized bill, the
best evidence of that information is the computer printout, because it is an
exact transcription of the handwritten records. 20 8 The Corpus Christi
court of appeals in Charles v. State209 held that the best evidence rule does
not apply to a photocopy of a newspaper subscription receipt.210 The
court reasoned that the defendant offered the photocopy only to show the
existence of the receipt and not to prove its contents.211 The court added
that even if the best evidence rule applied, the photocopy was admissible
under a statutory exception for photocopies because the record showed no
bona fide dispute as to the reproduction's authenticity. 212
203. The supreme court's proposed rules codify the common law rule of exclusion of
settlement agreements and discussions, but do not require exclusion of settlement when of-
fered for another purpose. New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XL-XLI.
204. McAllen Kentucky Fried Chicken No. I v. Leal, 627 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court further held that when the appellant
elected to bring to the jury the existence of the settlement agreement, appellee was entitled to
bring before the jury the entire agreement to explain the complete situation and prevent the
jury's being misled by selective portions. Id. at 484. For the supreme court's proposed rule
of "optional completeness," see New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at XXXVII.
205. Lawrence v. Boles, 631 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
206. The proposed Texas rules codify the best evidence rule. See New Rules, supra note
1, 641 S.W.2d at LXVI. Rule 1002 provides: "To prove the content of a writing, recording,
or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by law." Id. See also id. at LXVII (rule 1004 defines when origi-
nals are not required); id. at LXVI (rule 1003 defines when duplicates are admissible).
207. 634 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
208. Id. at 11.
209. 626 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
210. Id. at 870.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3731c (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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C Past Recordation of Recollection to Refresh Present Recollection
In S & S Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. Los Cedros, Inc.213 the Corpus Christi
court of appeals discussed the permissible extent and nature of refreshing
one's memory when a witness testifies from independent recollection. 214
In Los Cedros the plaintiffs president testified on direct examination about
a meeting with the defendant corporation's vice president that occurred on
a stated date at a designated place. On cross-examination the president
admitted that he specifically recalled the meeting, but was able to testify
about the date only because of a letter he had written that was entered into
evidence as an exhibit. The defendant argued on appeal that the president
had no independent recollection of the meeting and therefore could not
use the letter except for the limited purpose of refreshing his memory or as
a document of past recollection recorded. The Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals stated that it was apparent from the testimony that the president had
an independent recollection of the meeting, and that the use of the letter
was for purposes of refreshing his present recollection.215 The court ex-
plained that in present recollection refreshed a witness has some recollec-
tion of the event or matter in question and, after being allowed to view a
memorandum, can speak from memory.216 The court further explained
that it considered this to be a question that went to the credibility of wit-
nesses rather than an evidentiary question.217 The court opined that the
testimony elicited on cross-examination as to his memory of the date could
only serve to impeach prior admissible testimony.218
IX. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The dead man's statute219 has encountered increasing opposition, and
the new Texas Rules of Evidence may soon abrogate it.220 A Texas court
213. 628 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd).
214. For the supreme court rule governing the use of writings to refresh memory, see
New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LIV.
215. 628 S.W.2d at 495.
216. Id.; see I R. RAY, supra note 3, § 541, at 512-13.
217. 628 S.W.2d at 495.
218. Id. at 495.
219. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
220. See New Rules, supra note 1, 641 S.W.2d at LI. Texas proposed rule of evidence
601(b) provides:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judg-
ment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be al-
lowed to testify against the others as to any oral statement by, the testator,
intestate or ward, unless that testimony to the oral statement is corroborated
or unless the witness is called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and, the
provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or against
the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent based in whole or in part on
such oral statement. Except for the foregoing, a witness is not precluded from
giving evidence of or concerning any transaction with, any conversations with,
any admissions of, or statement by, a deceased or insane party or person
merely because the witness is a party to the action or a person interested in the
event thereof.
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discussed the dead man's statute in a trespass to try title action in which
the plaintiffs relied on their deceased father's adverse possession for their
claim of title under the ten-year statute of limitations. 22' The dead man's
statute prohibited the plaintiffs from testifying to their observations of
their father.222 Another court observed how easily waiver applies to the
dead man's statute.223 If a party initiates an inquiry about an adverse
witness's transaction with the deceased either in a deposition or in trial,
that party waives the statute and the witness may testify completely about
the transaction. 224
221. Bragg v. Wittenben, 623 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, writ
refd n.r.e.).
222. Id. at 690.
223. See Fulmer v. Rider, 635 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id. at 878-79.
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